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1.1 A fundamental principle of rating, established shortly after the Poor Relief Act in 1601, was that rating is a tax on the occupation of property and this is now enshrined by . Occupied rates liability is subject to the fulfilment of two conditions. Firstly, there must be rateable occupation of part or the whole of a hereditament and secondly, the hereditament has to be shown in the relevant non-domestic rating list.

1.2 Historically, if vacant and unoccupied, a hereditament attracted no liability. However, this altered following the introduction of the 鈥楨mpty Property Rate鈥� in 1966 and now establishes that the owner becomes rateable in respect of an unoccupied hereditament. For more on the treatment of empty property for rating purposes, see RM Section 2; Part 9.

1.3 The concept of the hereditament for rating purposes is inextricably bound up with the concept of rateable occupation. As already mentioned, rates are levied not on property but on persons who occupy property 鈥� it is a tax on occupation of hereditaments measured by their rental value. As per Lord Carnwath in the ATM cases (Cardtronics UK Ltd & others v. Sykes (VO) & others [2020]):

鈥樷€� although it may be convenient for the purpose of analysis to separate the issues of hereditament and occupation, they are in truth linked.鈥�

1.4 So, we need to know who the occupier is to identify the hereditament but cannot really know who an occupier is without establishing what the person is occupying. Once a rateable occupation has been established this will then act as a first step and help inform the identification of the hereditament which is to be valued. This is the subject that is dealt with in greater detail in Section 2; Part 2 鈥� Identification of the hereditament.

1.5 The occupier however is not defined in the Act. Section 65(2) provides that 鈥渨hether a hereditament 鈥� is occupied, and who is the occupier鈥� are to be determined by reference to the rules which would have applied under the 1967 Act [the General Rate Act 1967]. As a consequence, pre 1990 case law is still relevant and can, and should, be referred to. The rules that determine what constitutes rateable occupation and who is the rateable occupier have evolved over the years through case law. In particular, four essential ingredients have clearly emerged.

1.6 It was in John Laing & Son Ltd v Kingswood Area Assessment Committee [1949] 1 All ER 224 CA that the Court of Appeal gave the classic statement of the four essential ingredients that need to exist in order to determine whether an occupier is in rateable occupation:

• Actual occupation or possession that is of

• Benefit to the occupier and

• Exclusive for the particular purposes of the possessor; and

• the occupation must not be too Transient.

1.7 If any of these four essential ingredients or 鈥榯enets鈥� of rateable occupation (often given the acronym 鈥楢BET鈥�, from the bold letters above) are absent then the occupier cannot be in rateable occupation and in such cases it may be necessary to ascertain if there is another rateable occupier or whether one or more different hereditament(s) can be identified.

2.1 There is no statutory definition of the words 鈥榦ccupier鈥� or 鈥榦ccupation鈥� and so these are interpreted by legal precedent. In short, the issue of actual occupation primarily turns on what the parties in fact do, not on what they have a right to do. It follows that legal possession is by itself not enough: there must be evidence of actual use 鈥榦n the ground鈥�.

2.2 Actual occupation in its simplest form can mean the physical presence of the occupier on the land. It can also mean the acts by which the occupier makes use of, or even controls land. Whether or not a person is an (actual) occupier is a matter of fact, not law, determined by the facts relating to the use of the land and where a physical presence of occupation is evident. The legal right to possession is not enough to satisfy the rating test of actual occupation but similarly where actual occupation exists, the absence of legal possession by way of title cannot be a basis on which to avoid liability. It is now settled that 鈥渋t is immaterial whether the title to occupy is attributable to a lease, a licence or an easement鈥� [Westminster City Council v Southern Rly Co Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 322]. As was said in [R v St Pancras Assessment Committee [1877] 2 QBD 581]: 鈥淭he existence of legal possession thus understood is mainly, if not entirely, a question of law; the existence of actual possession is mainly, if not entirely, a question of fact鈥�.

2.3 By way of example, in Southwark London Borough v Briant Colour Printing Co Ltd [1977] 2 EGLR 105 workers of a company in the process of being wound up, and who seized occupation of the factory to undertake some printing contracts, were held to be in rateable occupation of the factory rather than the liquidators who were legally entitled to possession.

2.4 Similarly, in Westminster City Council v Tomlin [1990] 1 All ER 920 eight squatters calling themselves the 鈥楪uild of Transcultural Studies鈥� took occupation of the former Cambodian Embassy in London after the diplomats had deserted the premises. They were held to be jointly in rateable occupation, and thus liable for rates, notwithstanding they were trespassers with no legal right of occupation.

2.5 In most cases actual physical possession of land will be apparent to show an actual use. In some instances it has been shown that physical presence on land has not been necessary to establish actual occupation. In other cases physical possession has also been determined not to be 鈥渁ctual occupation鈥�. An example of this would be where the 鈥榰se鈥� is confined to works of repair, construction or redevelopment with no actual use for the purpose of the intended final occupier for which the premises exist. It might be that parts of a building site are used in such a way that there is actual occupation that is rateable, for instance site huts, leaving the remaining property, where the works are ongoing, as not rateably occupied.

2.6 So in Arbuckle Smith & Co Ltd v Greenock Corporation [1960] 1 All ER 568 a warehouse was being converted into a bonded store and was in the hands of builders. It was determined that the use in relation to the premises making them fit for the contemplated purpose, did not amount to the kind of actual use that is essential to rateable occupation.

2.7 In R v Melladew [1907] KB 192 the owner of warehouse premises used for furniture storage moved the furniture so that one of the buildings became vacant and entirely unused. The tenant retained control over the building throughout the period in the hope that business may pick up and the building would be ready and available for use, but he sought to avoid rates during the period it was not in use. He was held to be in rateable occupation even though the building was vacant, since there was an intention to reuse the building, it was not unexpected that parts of the warehousing may become vacant periodically but these were still being 鈥榰sed鈥� for the purpose of the occupier鈥檚 business and were ready for re-occupation as soon as demand materialised.

2.8 In Southend-on-Sea Corpn. v White [1900] 65 JP 7 the tenant of a seaside shop closed it during the out of season winter months and removed the stock, leaving only a few shelves and other chattels which would be needed on re-opening for the new season. The tenant was held to be in rateable occupation for the whole year (including the closed winter months). They had been in occupation and had every intention of returning, the shop being closed over the winter months as part of the normal operation of the business carried on there. As long as there is some use of the property, no matter how slight, there is 鈥榓ctual鈥� occupation in terms of rating.

3.1 Occupation must be exclusive for the particular purpose of the occupier. A rateable occupier should have the right to carry out the purpose of his or her occupation without anyone else on the premises doing the same thing and be able to exclude all others from using the hereditament in the same way. Occupation does not cease to be exclusive because other persons use the land in some other way, for their different uses may make them separately rateable.

3.2 Exclusivity means that there can only be one rateable occupier for a particular purpose and in determining whether an occupation is exclusive it is necessary to consider whether the person has enjoyment of the premises 鈥�to the substantial exclusion of all other persons鈥� (See the speech of Lord Russell of Killowen in the leading case on exclusivity: Westminster City Council v Southern Rly Co Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 322)

3.3 Difficulties can arise when there are several persons with rights of occupation and sometimes there may appear to be more than one occupier of land for a particular purpose. For example, a landlord may retain a degree of control over the use of parts occupied by another or others, or there may be occupation of part of a hereditament by two parties. The Southern Railway case helps us identify the rateable occupier in these situations and sets out some principles that may be applied: 鈥�the question of rateable occupation must depend on the facts of every case鈥�.in each case the degree of control must be examined, and the examination must be directed to the extent to which its exercise would interfere with the enjoyment by the occupant of the premises in his possession for the purposes which he occupies them鈥�. Where an owner (also in occupation) retains significant control over occupied parts, the owner will be treated as being in rateable occupation; whereas if he exercises no control, the occupier of the various parts will be in rateable occupation of those parts.

3.4 In the Southern Railway case, a number of occupations at Victoria Station and Beckenham Junction existed. It was argued that these formed part of the railway hereditament in view of the wide measures of control retained by Southern Railway Company over each station. The case considers all four ingredients of rateable occupation. In relation to exclusivity, Southern Railway did exercise a degree of control in respect of access to the sites within the stations and in relation to the WH Smith bookstalls, a greater degree of control was exercised, including the position of the book stalls within the station, the conduct of the WH Smith鈥檚 employees and also having a say in the publications that could be sold. However, it was determined that 鈥�Each of the buildings and structures were in the rateable occupation of the person using it for their own purposes鈥�. In respect of the WH Smith bookstall, despite it being within the station, WH Smith were in occupation of its bookstall, its occupation was exclusive and paramount for the purpose for which it was used as a bookstall and the degree of control Southern Railway exercised did not interfere with the enjoyment of the bookstall which they occupied to the exclusion of all other persons.

3.5 The requirement that, to be rateable, the occupation of a hereditament must be exclusive for the particular purposes of the occupier leaves open the possibility that the same unit of property may concurrently have more than one occupier, each occupying for a purpose of their own. This concept of a dual occupation has been considered in a number of cases and where there are two users of the same land for two different purposes it is possible to have two rateable occupiers of the same piece of land, although this is quite rare.

3.6 In Holywell Union Assessment Committee v Halkyn District Mines Drainage Co [1895] AC 117 a drainage company had power to make tunnels and widen existing tunnels/watercourses for draining mines under an easement. This easement reserved to the landowner and his mining lessees the right to use the tunnel for tramways provided this did not interfere with the drainage company use. The drainage company contended that they could not be rated inasmuch that they weren鈥檛 in exclusive occupation. It was held that the drainage company alone had the right of using the tunnels for the primary purpose for which they had been constructed and so were rateable, their occupation being considered paramount with any rights the landowner had being subordinate. However, Lord Herschell implied that more than one rateable occupier might exist for the same tunnel: the drainage company for the general use of the tunnel for drainage and the mining lessees for their use of the tramways laid in the same tunnel, this being a separate exclusive use of the same land or tunnel.

3.7 The 鈥淗alkyn鈥� case confirms that more than one rateable occupation can exist in respect of the continuing use of one piece of land for different purposes. Furthermore, it was not necessary in this case to confirm who was in overall 鈥減aramount occupation鈥�, the respective particular uses and the nature of the occupations make them rateable in their own right for their own particular purpose (they are each in exclusive occupation for their own particular purpose).

3.8 Other cases where separate occupations exist in respect of the same land and where rateable occupation of one or more of those occupations is established by satisfying the four ingredients of rateable occupation, and in particular by virtue of the occupiers being able to exclude the other(s) from using the land in the same way that they do will include:

Bartlett (VO) v Reservoir Aggregates Ltd [1985] 2 EGLR 171 concerned rateability of a mineral working situated in a reservoir owned by Thames Water who wanted the reservoir deepening. It was agreed Reservoir Aggregates could extract sand and gravel thereby deepening the reservoir. It was argued that Thames Water was in sole rateable occupation, but the Court of Appeal decided Reservoir Aggregates鈥� occupation was exclusive and its purpose of occupation 鈥� extracting gravel was separate from Thames Water鈥檚 occupation and purpose of having the reservoir deepened.

Pimlico Tramway Co v Greenwich Union (1893) LR 9 QB concerned rateability of tramlines situated in a public highway over which pedestrians and vehicles could pass. Whilst the tramway company could not exclude the pedestrians and motorists from passing over the surface of the rails, the tramway company were held in rateable occupation having exclusive use of the rails by their trams with flanged wheels.

3.9 In 2020 the UKSC revisited the meaning of paramount control and the identity of the rateable occupier in the Cardtronics case in respect of ATM sites situated at supermarkets and convenience stores. Subsequently the Court of Appeal applied these principles in their decision on Ludgate House. This is covered in more detail in Section 2; Part 2 鈥� Identification of the hereditament.

3.10 In the Cardtronics case the central issue was whether the retailer or the bank was in rateable occupation of each ATM site. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the site of permanent ATM machines, whilst capable of being a separate hereditament, remained in the rateable occupation of the 鈥榟ost鈥� store. The relationship between the host store and ATM operator being akin to that of a landlord and lodger. The Upper Tribunal had determined that the external facing sites of machines were in separate rateable occupation but not the internal facing sites. The Court of Appeal had held that none of the sites were separately rateable.

3.11 On consideration of who was in rateable occupation the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal who had determined that the internal ATM鈥檚 furthered the retailer鈥檚 general business purposes, and that both the retailer and the ATM operators shared the economic fruits of the activity for which the space was used. Consequently, the Court of Appeal had been correct to determine that the retailers remained in rateable occupation. Paramount control of the ATM site remained with the host store as part of the general business offering of the retailer.

3.12 The Supreme Court held that the site of external facing ATMs were to be treated no differently and that the host store remained in occupation, despite being available for use by a wider market than the internal ATMs. Both internal and external ATMs were part of the host stores retail business and should be treated no differently, in much the same way that there is no difference in treatment between internal and external ATM sites at a banking establishment.

3.13 The Westminster case was not held to be wrong in Cardtronics, nor was it the subject of serious criticism. The Supreme Court saw no inconsistency between the conclusion emerging from the facts in the Cardtronics case and the John Laing and Holywell Union, and the Westminster case; rather it saw that conclusion as consistent with the 鈥榣odger鈥� principle as described in the latter case. The decision in Cardtronics though perhaps acts as a counterweight to the Westminster case and illustrates the importance of also having regard to the bigger picture.

4.1 A third requirement of rateable occupation is that the occupation must be of some benefit or value to the rateable occupier. This does not mean that it must be profitable in a monetary sense and although this is a prime motive behind many occupations other reasons may include a public body fulfilling a statutory requirement such as the provision of local authority schools, libraries or sewerage works, or some other special need of the occupier. A great part of the difficulty disappears if it is remembered that the test of rateability is not whether the property will produce profit, but whether it will serve a purpose that someone is willing to pay a rent for.

4.2 The fallacy that financial profit is essential to the existence of liability was clarified by the Court of Appeal in R v London School Board [1886] 17 QBD 738 which concerned whether there was beneficial occupation of a school. The school board thought they should be excluded from the range of potential tenants since although they occupied the premises, it could make no profit from them. It was held that the school board (who wanted the premises and would take them) ought to be regarded as a possible hypothetical tenant and clarifying the confusion between profit versus beneficial occupation; Fry LJ stated that:

鈥溾赌�it does not by any means follow that because there is no profit there is no value鈥� The only question is whether the person to be considered as a tenant could reasonably be expected to take the premises from any motive鈥�

4.3 In circumstances when someone is in apparent occupation of land but unable to derive any benefit then beneficial occupation will not exist and the land may be said to be 鈥榮truck with sterility鈥�. Examples will include land dedicated to a public highway, which no tenant would be able to occupy beneficially for as long as the dedication exists; also parks and recreation grounds subject to public rights of user are not in the beneficial occupation of the relevant authority which owns and maintains them (although such parks are now specifically treated as exempt)..

4.4 In Hare v Overseers of Putney (1891) 7 QBD 223 where a toll bridge was purchased by the Metropolitan Board of Works and opened to the public free of toll, MBW were not rateable occupiers of the bridge, the bridge being kept up for the benefit and use of the public and MBW had no power to do anything to or on the bridge except keep it for the benefit of the public.

4.5In Lambeth Overseers v LCC (1897) AC 625 where LCC purchased a park under a special Act and maintained it for recreational purposes. It was held that the public had the right to use the park in perpetuity and LCC were not in occupation. The land was 鈥渟truck with sterility鈥� as no one could derive a greater benefit from it than anyone else.

5.1 The final requirement of rateable occupation is that there must be a necessary degree of permanence and to be rateable the occupation of the land comprising the hereditament must exist for not too transient a period. Consideration should be given not only to the length of occupation but also to its character and nature.

5.2 In R v St. Pancras Assessment Committee (1887) 2 QBD 581 an occupation that was considered too transient comprised two advertising hoardings, one in front of a building under construction, the other in front of a house awaiting letting. In the judgement Lush J set out a summary as to what constitutes rateable occupation and in relation to permanence referred to the example of 鈥�An itinerant showman who erects a temporary structure for his performances, may be in exclusive actual possession, and may, with strict grammatical propriety, be said to occupy the ground on which his structure is placed, but it is clear that he is not the such an occupier as the statute intends鈥� a transient, temporary holding of land is not enough to make the holding rateable.鈥�

5.3 In relation to the length of the period of occupation that is necessary to be rateable, this has been considered in London County Council v Wilkins (VO) (1957) AC 362where temporary builders huts associated with construction of a school that had remained in position for 18 and 21 months were not deemed too transient to be rateable. Again, in McAlpine (Sir Robert) v Payne (VO) (1969) RA 368 five separately assessed sheds in situ for between six and seven months were held to be not rateable. The tribunal expressed an opinion that in general a period of less than twelve months was too transient.

5.4 Whilst the length of occupation is a factor the character and nature of the occupation is also a consideration. In Dick Hampton (Earth Moving) v Lewis (1976) QB 254 borrow pits occupied for less than twelve months for the extraction of gravel being used in construction of an adjoining motorway were held to be rateable. Noting the working rule of twelve months on site for a builders hut to be rateable the Court pointed out there was no authority for this rule and that the House of Lords in 鈥淟CC v Wilkins鈥� had only held there must be a sufficient degree of 鈥榩ermanence鈥�. In this case the landscape had been changed permanently as a result of the extraction operation with 鈥渉uge slices dug out of the hillside 鈥�.more permanent than massive buildings鈥� The period of occupation (less than twelve months) was deemed of vastly less importance than the consequences with the effect that the degree of permanence for rateable occupation was considered established.

5.5 In contrast, where an intermittent use is intended to operate for a reasonable period and the occupation granted has a degree of permanence, the character and nature of the occupation has been deemed to be a rateable occupation.

5.6 In Hall (VO) v Darwen Borough Council and Silcock Bros. (Amusements) Ltd (1957) 2 RRC 329 the corporation licensed the company 鈥榯o occupy and use for the purposes of a fairground鈥� certain vacant land owned by the corporation. By the terms of the licence the company were to hold (and did hold) at least two fairs each year. The company had the prior right to use the land at any time, though the corporation could use the land when the company did not require it. The Lands Tribunal held the company to be in rateable occupation and considered that their right, although exercised infrequently, amounted to 鈥渃onstructive occupation鈥�. Holding two fairs a year, coupled with an agreement conferring the right to hold fairs over a reasonable period was enough to establish rateable occupation. (The emphasis here should be on the 鈥渞ight鈥� to hold two or more fairs, not necessarily the seven-year licence). The fact that they had the right over a reasonable period and exercised the right only twice was enough, coupled with the right to occupy more times if desired and subject to 14 days鈥� notice. The rateable occupier in this case was the operator (the company) and not the owner of the site.

5.7 The cases referred to on transience relate to temporary buildings or the temporary or intermittent use of land. The four ingredients of rateable occupation apply equally to permanent buildings and so a reasonable question may be whether a three or six month occupation of a shop, factory or office amounts to rateable occupation. The situation is different when dealing with permanent buildings. Temporary structures such as builders hut are more in line with the 鈥榳ayfarer or itinerant showman鈥� referred to by Lush J in 鈥淟CC v Wilkins鈥� where the permanence of occupation will depend on the facts of the case. In relation to permanent buildings there will be occupation by the present occupier or some successor for years to come and the situation may be differentiated from a temporary structure and occupation. The difference is addressed in McAlpine (Sir Robert) v Payne (VO) (1969) RA 368 鈥�鈥業s there a minimum period for establishing that an occupation is not too transient?鈥� and if there is 鈥榃hat is it?鈥� It is I think clear that for permanent buildings there is no fixed period: theoretically at any rate occupation of a house or a shop for even a day could attract rateability. But the authorities I think show clearly that different considerations apply to temporary structures. These are less likely to be 鈥榮ettlers鈥� and more likely to be 鈥榳ayfarers鈥�.鈥�

6.1 The 1988 Act, as with predecessor legislation, only specifies 鈥渓ands鈥� as rateable together with coal mines, other mines and a few rights such as advertising rights (See RM S.2 Pt.2).

6.2 Whilst personal property is no longer rateable, certain 鈥楥hattels鈥� which are neither land nor buildings but which are sufficiently attached to, and enjoyed with, land over a sufficient period so that its value is enhanced may form part of the rateable hereditament.

6.3 The position as to rateability of chattels has been established by case law. The leading decision was given by the House of Lords in London County Council v Wilkins (VO) (1957) AC 362 and confirmed that chattels, if enjoyed with land and enhancing the value of it, may be rated with the land. The case related to four builder鈥檚 huts, used by contractors during a contract to erect a new school. It was claimed by the ratepayers that the huts were chattels and as such not rateable.

6.4 The Lands Tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords all rejected the ratepayer鈥檚 contentions. In the House of Lords, Viscount Kilmuir LC said:

鈥業 think that the respondent鈥檚 submission was right, viz, that the test of rateability is whether there is evidence that the structures were enjoyed with the land and enhanced its value. In considering this, the intention of the erector and the other elements of annexation, period, size, quality, amenities and purpose are all material. All these factors are important, but intention, and certainly what I may call the 鈥渃onscious element鈥� in intention, is no more than one factor and its importance is not overriding. The question is eminently one of fact 鈥︹€�

Lord Radcliffe said:

鈥樷€� I think it equally well established that a structure placed on another person鈥檚 land can with it form a rateable hereditament, even though the structure remains in law a chattel and as such the property of the person who placed it there. It has been habitual practice to treat gas and water pipes, drains and sewers, telegraph posts placed in, and telegraph or telephone wires placed over, land as being themselves rateable subjects. Yet I do not think that there is any foundation for supposing that when the undertaker, equipped with the licence of the owner of the soil or with statutory powers, affixes his apparatus to a building or lays it in or on the soil the law regards him as thereby making it part of the freehold. It is quite common in these cases to find stress laid on the point that the apparatus concerned remains the 鈥渆xclusive property鈥� of the undertakers 鈥︹€�

and later in the same speech he said:

鈥榳hen the owners of pipes, cables, posts, etc., are rated as occupiers they are rated in respect of those things themselves, by means of which they occupy land, not merely in respect of the land that is occupied 鈥︹€�

The huts were in situ for between eighteen and twenty-one months, which was held to be sufficiently permanent for rateability.

6.5 Subsequently, in Field Place Caravan Park Ltd v Harding (VO) (1966) 2 QB 484, 3 all ER 247, 13 RRC 74, a caravan site contained a number of residential caravans which had been in position for more than a year. The appellant ratepayers contended that the caravan itself was a chattel and should not be included in the assessment. Dismissing the appeal Lord Denning MR said:

*鈥楾he correct proposition today is that, although a chattel is not a rateable hereditament by itself, nevertheless it may become rateable together with land, if it is placed on a piece of land and enjoyed with it in such circumstances and which such a degree of permanence that the chattel with the land can together be regarded as one unit of occupation.鈥� *

6.6 The builder鈥檚 huts in Wilkins and more recently the storage containers in Storehire (UK) Ltd v Wojcik (1991) LT RA 39 were held by the Lands Tribunal not to be 鈥榩lant鈥�. If the chattel being considered is plant or machinery, then rateability is governed by legislation which is considered in RM S.2 Pt.2 Hereditament para 10 and in RM S.5 Pt. 3 Valuation of Plant & Machinery, the above paragraphs and in more detail in other sections of this manual.

6.7 A case where the plant and machinery regulations effectively exempted a chattel which would otherwise have been treated as rateable with the land on which it stood arose in the case of Platts (NH) & Sons v Hanstock (Valuation Officer) (1963) LT 3 RVR 344; 10 RRC 57, which related to an automatic milk vending machine.

6.8 Subsequent decisions of the Lands Tribunal have decided that the following chattels are all rateable: a hinged carport, a floating clubhouse, a spoil heap worked for shale, shipping containers used for storage and a flower stall in a shopping centre.

6.9 It is now clear that the occupier of a chattel enjoyed with the land for a sufficient time may be rateable, not just for the land but also for the chattel, which occupies land, itself. There cannot be assessment of chattels alone; there must first be occupation of land (except where specific statutory provision has been made to the contrary, for instance gas meters). For more information in respect of gas meters, refer to RM S.3 Pt.2 Hereditaments Valued by the Central Valuation Officer

6.10 In determining rateability of chattels therefore one must consider 鈥�

1. Is the chattel an item of plant or machinery in which case, rateability will be determined by the relevant regulations?
2. A chattel cannot be rated by itself.
3. Is the chattel enjoyed with land and with such a degree or permanence that the chattel with the land can be regarded as one unit of occupation?
4. Is the occupation of the land enhanced by its being occupied with the chattel

6.11 It is anticipated that only in relation to (iii) and the issue of transience, or a lack of permanence of the occupation of the chattel, that difficulties might be encountered. When considering permanence in relation to whether a chattel is properly rated in respect of a rateable occupation of land the Lands Tribunal has generally adopted a 鈥榬ule of thumb鈥� of 12 months, although this is by no means an absolute rule. For more on this see para 5.4 above and the case of Dick Hampton (Earth Moving) v Lewis (1976) QB 254.

6.12 Physical permanence in terms of attachment to the land is not required, indeed in many of the decided cases the chattels determined as rateable have remained capable of being moved readily; notably in relation to caravans and floating vessels. What is most important is the expectation in terms of the duration of the occupation by the chattel of land. Movement of the chattel within the hereditament is not a bar to it being rated with the land. In Thomas (VO) v Witney Aquatic Co Ltd (1972) LT RA 493, the floating clubhouse (a chattel) was moved within the hereditament (a lake) to a winter mooring.

6.13 Contractor鈥檚 site huts and floating hereditaments, as specific examples of chattels commonly found rateable, are dealt with in detail in RM S.5a Section 300: Contractors site huts, and RM S.5a Section 400: Floating hereditaments respectively where further and class specific advice is given.